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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2008, the Cuban government announced its intention
to update its socialist economic model, and develop for the
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first time a significant private sector.1 These reforms were
intended to alleviate a growing national debt and state-labor
surplus by shifting significant overemployment in the state
sector into the newly expanding private sector. 2 To
accomplish this, the Cuban government expanded the list of
private-sector business licenses (trabajo por cuenta propia) to
201 lines of work, while simultaneously laying off surplus
state labor—allowing it to be absorbed into the private
workforce.3 As of today, approximately 10% of the Cuban
labor force has already been laid off from state employment,
and another 21% is expected to follow. 4 Although, the
government hoped that these recently released state workers
would be able to take advantage of the newly expanded

1 Geoff Thale, Labor Rights and Cuba’s Economic Reforms, Washington
office on Latin America 2 (Dec. 2013),
http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/Labor_Rights_and_Cubas_Ec
onomic_Reforms.pdf.
Philip Peters, Cuba’s Entrepreneurs: Foundation of a New Private Sector,
American (Jul. 2012),
http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LexingtonCubaEntrepreneurs
-1.pdf.
2

Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Institutional Changes of Cuba’s Economic-Social
Reforms, Brookings 2 (Aug. 2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/08/
cubas-economic-social-reformmesalago/cubaseconomicsocialreformsmesalago.pdf.
3

4

Id. at 8.
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entrepreneurial licenses and support themselves through
self-employment, this has not yet been the case.
Although Cuba’s recent reforms have expanded some
entrepreneurial freedoms, entrepreneurship in Cuba still
remains heavily circumscribed. Currently, both practical and
legal restrictions on market access are prevalent. The legal
restrictions are the result of the still heavy circumscription of
entrepreneurial freedoms, and the practical restrictions are
the result of the unavailability of business prerequisites such
as storefront, capital, supplies, and inventory. Together these
inefficiencies have caused access to the Cuban private sector
to be far too restricted to support the rapid influx of state
labor. This paper proposes that for the privatization of a
socialist economy to occur efficiently, economic reforms
must first create a legal system with sufficient
entrepreneurial freedoms, secondly provide its citizens with
sufficient access to business prerequisites, and finally the
transition of state labor and assets into the private sector
must occur gradually enough to allow these freedoms to
develop. By not addressing these limitations before
relocating 10-31% of the labor force into the private sector,
the Cuban Government has disenfranchised these workers.
Today, the Cuban private sector is far too restricted to allow
Cuban entrepreneurs to be successful, and this is resulting in
increases of both labor exploitation and inequality.

II.

MOTIVATION
SOLUTION

FOR

CHANGE: PRIVATIZATION

AS A
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The Cuban economy operates as a socialist regime. 5
Under this system, the means of production are centrally
owned and operated by the state. As a result, nearly every
public service is provided by the government as opposed to
private businesses. Unlike in the United States, in Cuba
barbers, electricians, repairmen, vendors, etc., are all state
employees. Accordingly, the Cuban government has
historically been the single largest employer on the island,
and is responsible for 95% of the island’s gross domestic
product. 6 While some limited entrepreneurship has
historically been permitted, the private sector has always
been heavily circumscribed. Historically, government
restrictions
have
limited
Cuban
entrepreneurs
(cuentapropistas) to only 158 lines of work and forbid them
from hiring employees.7 As a result, Cuba’s private sector
has essentially been negligible in terms of employment (47% of the labor force) and production (contributing only 5%
to GDP).8
The problem which Cuba now faces is that many of its
state-owned enterprises (SOE) are operating at a loss, and
are relying on additional state subsidies to remain in

Id. at 2.
Philip Peters, Cuba’s Entrepreneurs: Foundation of a New Private Sector,
American 9 (Jul. 2012),
http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LexingtonCubaEntrepreneurs
-1.pdf.
7 Id. at 5.
8 Id. at 9.
5
6
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operation.9 Because there is no private sector to replace these
inefficient SOEs, necessary public services would become
unavailable without a government subsidy. As a result, the
Cuban government has become trapped in a cycle of
inefficient spending, which has threatened to bankrupt the
nation. To resolve these inefficiencies and excessive
spending, the Cuban government has turned to increased
privatization as a way to reform its economic model.
In 2012, the Cuban government made a series of changes
to the labor code increasing the role of private business in
the economy. These changes to the labor code are meant to
address this over-nationalization of the economy by shifting
unprofitable state businesses into the newly expanding
private sector—thereby reducing government spending.
Over time, Cuba hopes to grow its private sector production
from 5% to 45-50% of the island’s GDP, and is prepared to
lay off as many 1.8 million state workers (approximately at
least 31% of the labor force) to accomplish this.10 Altogether,
over 300 articles of the labor code have been proposed for

Geoff Thale, Labor Rights and Cuba’s Economic Reforms, Washington
office on Latin America 2 (Dec. 2013),
http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/Labor_Rights_and_Cubas_Ec
onomic_Reforms.pdf.

9

Philip Peters, A Viewers Guide to Cuba’s Economic Reforms, American 9
(May 2012),
http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LexingtonViewersGuide1.pdf.

10
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modification.11 These changes and their general goals have
been outlined in a publication by the government entitled
Lineamientos de la Política Económica y Social del Partido y la
Revolución, and are discussed in detail below.12
III.

WHAT

CHANGES HAVE THE

TO THE CUBAN ECONOMY?

CUBAN

REFORMS MADE

A. SMALL BUSINESS
The private sector has long been a negligible part of the
Cuban economy, and this was no accident. Since the start of
the Castro era, the Cuban government instituted numerous
legislation intentionally designed to limit entrepreneurship.
Such restrictions were a symptom of the socialist ideology
propagated by Fidel Castro, who viewed the private sector
as—at best—a necessary evil.13 However, the recent reforms
the Cuban labor code deviate from this line of thinking.

Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Institutional Changes of Cuba’s Economic-Social
Reforms, Brookings 2 (Aug. 2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/08/
cubas-economic-social-reformmesalago/cubaseconomicsocialreformsmesalago.pdf.
12 Geoff Thale, Labor Rights and Cuba’s Economic Reforms, Washington
office on Latin America 2 (Dec. 2013),
http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/Labor_Rights_and_Cubas_Ec
onomic_Reforms.pdf.
13 Philip Peters, A Viewers Guide to Cuba’s Economic Reforms, American 4
(May 2012),
http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LexingtonViewersGuide1.pdf.
11
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Recently, the Cuban government has begun to recognize the
need for privatization, in order to deal with the island
nation’s abysmal economic production. 14 As a result, the
government has expanded the number of available forms of
private sector employment and begun to legalize what many
would consider normal business practices. Some of the key
legislative changes are as follows:
· The self-employed may now hire employees15
· Health and safety standards extend to the private
sector16
· Non-discrimination in hiring17
· Expanded seating in restaurants from 12 to 50
persons18
· Expanded private employment to 201 lines of work 19
· Government goal to increase private sector
production from 5% to 45-50% of GDP
Cuba’s early reforms have attempted to create a middle
ground, allowing some private businesses to operate
independently, while requiring others to operate as private

Id.
Id. at 12.
16 Steve Ludham, Economic Changes in Cuba-What About the Workers?,
Morning Star (Jul. 2014), http://www.morningstaronline.co.uk/a-3736Economic-changes-in-Cuba-What-about-the-workers.
17 Id.
18 Philip Peters, Cuba’s Entrepreneurs: Foundation of a New Private Sector,
American 11 (Jul. 2012),
http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LexingtonCubaEntrepreneurs
-1.pdf.
19 Id. at 9.
14
15
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sector cooperatives. 20 These cooperatives maintain
ownership of the enterprises with the state, but cede day-today operations and a portion of the profits to private
workers. In total, cooperatives and otherwise, Cuban citizens
are now allowed to privately operate one of 201 tightly
licensed businesses. 21 Additionally, owners of these
businesses are now permitted to hire employees.22 This is a
distinction from past years, when the hiring of employees in
the private sector was limited to only family members.
However, despite this expansion in private sector
business licenses, meaningful entrepreneurship in Cuba
remains heavily circumscribed. This is because the vast
majority of Cuban business licenses are for menial labor
such as selling fruit, repairing umbrellas, refilling lighters,
and other tasks too small for government attention. 23

Raúl J. Valdés-Fauli, Cuba’s Private Sector and the New Legal Framework,
Fox Rothschild LLP (Jul. 2015),
http://www.foxrothschild.com/publications/cuban-private-sector-andthe-new-cuba-legal-framework/.
20

Jose Azel, The New Cuba Policy: Fallacies and Implications, World Affairs
Journal, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/new-cuba-policyfallacies-and-implications.
22 Philip Peters, A Viewers Guide to Cuba’s Economic Reforms, American
(May 2012),
http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LexingtonViewersGuide1.pdf.
21

Jose Azel, The New Cuba Policy: Fallacies and Implications, World Affairs
Journal, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/new-cuba-policyfallacies-and-implications.
23
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Regardless, despite these seemingly limited freedoms, the
recent reforms are the strongest endorsement of private
business in the Castro era. 24 By gradually relieving these
restrictions, the hope is that private individuals will be able
to play a larger role in the nation’s economy. However, for
entrepreneurship in Cuba to find long-term success, it is
likely that more meaningful changes will be needed.
B. INCREASES IN PROPERTY RIGHTS
For the first time since 1959, Cubans are now allowed
to legally execute transfers of title to both their homes and
automobiles.25 Prior to this reform, transfers of title occurred
under the “Permuta” system. 26 This system operated as
essentially a barter between two homeowners, in which the
two properties were simply traded for one another. 27
Moreover, the system was heavily regulated by the
government.28 First, the two properties in question had to be
of equal value.29 Second, no money could be included in the

Philip Peters, A Viewers Guide to Cuba’s Economic Reforms, American
(May 2012),
http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LexingtonViewersGuide1.pdf.
24

Lina Forero, Book Note, The Cuban Government Approves Guidelines to
Reform Cuba’s Economic Model and Develops an Implementation Strategy, 17
LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS, 761, 764 (2012).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
25
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transfer. 30 Finally, the government had to approve the
transaction. 31 Not only was this system a source of
corruption on the island, but had also effectively strangled
the transfer of real property.32
This restriction on property transfers has contributed
to the stagnation of private business. 33 Currently, the
majority of private businesses are operated from the home,
with 85% of businesses having no employees.34 However, as
significant growth in the private sector occurs, businesses
will need the freedom to acquire property in which to grow.
The new system addresses this by liberalizing the access to
property and loosening government regulations on
transfers. 35 All that is now required is notary approval,
funding of the transaction through a state bank, and
payment of a still undetermined tax. 36 Most crucially, the
new system allows for transfers of property for money, 37
thereby removing the most crippling restriction of the

Id.
Id.
32 Id. at 764-65.
33 Id.
34 Geoff Thale, Cuba’s New Labor Code and Foreign Investment Law:
Implications for Workers, Washington Office on Latin America (Jul. 2014),
http://www.wola.org/commentary/cuba_s_new_labor_code_and_forei
gn_investment_law_implications_for_workers.
35 Lina Forero, Book Note, The Cuban Government Approves Guidelines to
Reform Cuba’s Economic Model and Develops an Implementation Strategy, 17
LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS, 761, 765 (2012).
36 Id. at 764.
37 Id.
30
31
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“Permuta” system: the need to own property in order to
acquire property. While property law in Cuba remains
restrictive, the new legislation is an indication of its
evolution.
C. FOREIGN INVESTMENT
One of the most significant developments in Cuban
legislation is the new policy toward foreign investment. This
area has the potential to rapidly update the island’s
economic condition.38 However, to be successful, it must be
managed correctly. Since Raul Castro took office in 2008,
Cuba has gradually broadened the criteria used for
accepting foreign investment projects.39 Initially, the criteria
used for accepting foreign investment were principally
limited to projects that would bring new capital, markets, or
technology to the island. Today, Cuba has expanded these
criteria to include all sectors except health care, education
and the armed forces.40 Crucially, these new policies have
expanded the use of foreign investment to allow for job
creation and increases to national production.41 The hope is
that this expansion of foreign investment will help
supplement Cuba’s struggling domestic banking industry,

Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Can Cuba’s Reforms Succeed?, Americas Quarterly,
http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/can-cubas-economicreforms-succeed.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.

38
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by introducing new avenues of capital and investment.42 As
a result, the new policies represent a significant step in
making investment in Cuba more attractive. Nevertheless,
despite these changes, foreign investment has yet to make a
significant impact on the island’s economy. Many factors
still make Cuba unattractive to foreign investment, such as
the low purchasing power of the Cuban public, a highly
selective approval process, and numerous policies restricting
management by foreign investors.43
IV.

SUCCESSFUL PRIVATIZATION: LEGAL
REFORMS

AND

MARKET

By studying the privatizations of the socialist
economies of China and Eastern Europe, economists have
developed theories as to the reasons for their success. The
conclusion of this research is that for the privatization of a
socialist economy to be successful, a nation must reform
both its laws and market infrastructure. This theory is based
on the reasoning that both the legislation and market
environment developed under a socialist system are
insufficient to address the circumstances that will arise in a

Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Institutional Changes of Cuba’s Economic-Social
Reforms, Brookings 8 (Aug. 2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/08/
cubas-economic-social-reformmesalago/cubaseconomicsocialreformsmesalago.pdf.
42

Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Can Cuba’s Reforms Succeed?, Americas Quarterly,
http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/can-cubas-economicreforms-succeed.
43
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private market.44 This is because both of these environments
work together to support the private sector. While the legal
environment provides the scope of freedoms to market
access, the market infrastructure provides the tools
necessary for participating in private enterprise. As a result,
an efficient private sector cannot develop without both of
these operating efficiently.
V.

REFORM OF THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

As shown above, a private sector cannot succeed in
isolation, and requires both legal and market reforms to
allow it to be successful. Legal reform is perhaps the most
obvious of these changes, and is undoubtedly necessary to
commence the process of privatization. However, for
privatization to be successful, legal reform must do more
than legalize private entrepreneurship. At a minimum, a
successful private sector must promote competition and
provide market actors the legal freedoms necessary to
efficiently enter the market. 45 As a result, without legal
reform, excessive market restriction will inevitably lead to
unemployment, exploitation, and inefficient pricing.46 While
numerous changes are needed, the aspects of the legal
environment most in need of reform are: contract law,

Michele Balfour, A Privatization Test: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and
Poland, 17 Fordham International L. J. 85, 85-6 (1993).
45 Id.
46 Id.

44
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entrepreneurial diversity, and political stability.47 This paper
defines these elements as the country’s “legal environment.”
A. CONTRACTUAL FREEDOMS
Extensive contractual freedoms are essential for the
private sector to function efficiently. The greater the
freedoms of contract, the greater opportunity the market has
to maximize the value of its assets. 48 This is because
restrictive contract laws have the effect of reducing the
available number of buyers and sellers. Such restrictions
prevent parties from receiving the highest price available for
their goods and services. Efficient prices should be
determined by the market, rising and falling with supply
and demand. However, for such a market to function
efficiently, expansive contractual freedoms are necessary.49
As private individuals are unlikely to finance and
operate entire businesses on their own, there must be legal
freedom to develop the employment and investment
relationships necessary to fund privatization. Contract rights
need special attention during the privatization of socialist
nations, due to the fact that central planning economies are
operated by the state as opposed to private actors. As a
result, the legal framework in this area is at risk of being
overly restrictive. In fact, in some situations certain essential
contractual freedoms and relationships may be entirely

47
48
49

Id.
Id.
Id. at 86.
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nonexistent or prohibited. Restricting the freedom of
contract is symptomatic of socialist systems, and such
restrictions reduce efficiency in the private sector.50 In order
to attract investment and promote efficiency, such freedoms
should be liberalized.51
B. ENTREPRENEURIAL DIVERSITY
Transitioning economies lacking investment and
infrastructure have attempted to mitigate these deficiencies
by restricting the rate at which employment is privatized.
The hope is that by restricting the number of permissible
forms of self-employment, the economy will be able to avoid
the inefficiencies created by its lack of capital and
infrastructure. While such restrictions may be well
intentioned, over restriction of the permissible forms of selfemployment will also create a risk of inefficient production.
For an economy to be competitive, it must allow
actors to efficiently enter the market. 52 Limitations on the
lines of work permitted to operate in the private sector are
the most direct restriction on market access. 53 Without
sufficient entrepreneurial diversity, there is a significant risk
of unemployment.54 This is because if there are insufficient
jobs available to accommodate the size of the private

50

Id.

51

Id. at 85.

52
53
54

Id. at 89.
Id. at 89-90.
Id.
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workforce, production in these segments will suffer from
surplus labor. Essentially, as the supply of workers rises past
the demand for their services, prices for such services will
drop until excess workers can no longer afford to operate
and leave the market. Accordingly, a sufficient amount of
entrepreneurial diversity is necessary to allow these workers
the opportunity to find new employment. While it is not
necessary for a nation to privatize its entire economic
production, it must privatize a sufficient portion of its
economy to accommodate the private workforce.
C. POLITICAL STABILITY
A successful economic transition will not occur
overnight. Therefore, for privatization to be successful, it
must be consistently supported by the government. Political
stability is essential to ensure that the long-term goals of the
transition are met and supported by the following regimes.55
An economic reform is no small feat, and requires the full
and consistent support of the government. 56 A stable
government lends credibility to the hope that the reforms are
not merely temporary efforts that will be overturned by the
next regime. 57 Such credibility is necessary to attract
sufficient long-term investment.

55

Id. at 91

56

Id.

57

Id.
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In addition to these legal reforms, for a privatization
to be successful it is necessary to reform a nation’s market
infrastructure. 58 This is a practical reform and largely
concerns the logistics necessary for privatization. For a
market to function efficiently, workers must have access to
the market prerequisites necessary for enjoying the newlycreated entrepreneurial freedoms. 59 Without an efficient
market infrastructure, market actors will not have the
resources necessary for entering the private market, despite
the legal freedom to do so. These resources include access to
capital/financing, access to supplies and inventory, and
access to property/storefront. 60 This paper defines these
elements as the country’s “market infrastructure.”
A. PROPERTY
Efficient access to property is essential to encourage
investment. 61 As a legislature grants a private market the
legal freedom to develop, it must provide it with the room to
do so. Real property, particularly storefront, is essentially
the garden in which a private sector is destined to grow. As
a result, the unavailability of real property can indirectly
place a ceiling on private sector development. Ultimately,
restrictions on access to real property inhibit the ability of

58
59
60
61

Id. at 90.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 87.
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individuals to enter the market. These restrictions may result
from of overly strict regulations on the transfer of real
property, dilapidated infrastructure, or real property
shortages. Regardless of the form, either will indirectly
inhibit the ability of individuals to enter the market. 62
Accordingly, it is essential for the privatizing nation to not
only make efforts to liberalize the transfer of property, but
also to rebuild and revitalize dilapidated infrastructure in
order to ensure that there is sufficient access to property for
individuals to enter the market.
B. SUPPLIES AND INVENTORY
As an economy transitions to incorporate private
enterprise, a nation must also ensure that its supply chain
adapts as well. An infrastructure developed under a socialist
system must be adapted to provide private workers access to
a stream of supplies and inventory. Not only is a newly
developing private business sensitive to shortages of
business necessities, but unlike state-owned enterprises, a
private business cannot rely on government subsidies and
taxes to remain in operation. As a result, to promote the
growth of private business, a transitioning economy must
monitor the condition of its market infrastructure in order to
prevent such shortages from occurring. In the early years of
privatization, private wholesale markets, delivery
companies, and suppliers are not likely to develop. As a
result, state infrastructure should be adapted to supplement

Michele Balfour, A Privatization Test: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and
Poland, 17 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL L. J. 85, 88 (1993).
62
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private sector growth. 63 Accordingly, as with access to
property, without sufficient access to supplies and
inventory, private enterprise will fail to develop, despite the
legislative freedom to do so.
C. CAPITAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
Finally, the government must ensure that there is a
banking system adequate to support privatization.64 Banking
and capital are the lifeblood of economic reform, and
without them, a private sector cannot develop. Access to
financing is necessary not only to supplement personal
savings and investment, but also to prevent inequality.
Without equal access to financing, entrance to the market
will be unequally skewed by access to personal wealth. Such
circumstances not only restricts access to the market, but
also reduces competition and production by preventing
successful business models from entering the market. As a
result, access to banking, financial intermediaries, and
foreign investment is essential to allow all market actors an
opportunity to enter the market, as opposed to only the
wealthy.65
VII.

THE PACE OF PRIVATIZATION

While the necessary reforms to the legal and market
environment are discussed above, left undiscussed is the
manner and pace at which such reforms should be

63
64
65

Id. at 89.
Id. at 92-93.
Id. at 93.
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implemented. An effective pace of privatization is not only
dependent on the speed at which state labor and assets are
transitioned into the private sector, but it is also dependent
on the legal and market reforms that proceed and prepare
for privatization. 66 The legal and market infrastructure
developed in a socialist economy are not adequate to
address the controversies that arise in private markets.67 As
a result, it is essential to reform these environments prior to
commencing privatization. 68 If state-labor and assets are
transitioned into the private sector before these reforms have
been implemented, inefficiencies in the private market will
develop.69
China presents an excellent example of a successful
transition, as nearly 20 years of various piecemeal reforms
preceded large-scale privatization of state labor and assets.70
These reforms began by utilizing private cooperatives to
increase the autonomy and independence of state-owned

Jie Gan, Privatization in China: Experiences and Lessons, Hong Kong
University of Science and Technology, 2-4, (2008),
http://english.ckgsb.edu.cn/sites/default/files/privatization_in_china.
pdf.
67 Id.
68 Surijit S. Sidhu, Privatization and Deregulation: Needed Policy Reforms for
Agribusiness Development, 72 (1999).
69 Uner Kirdar, A World Fit for People, 90 (1994).
70 Jie Gan, Privatization in China: Experiences and Lessons, Hong Kong
University of Science and Technology, 2-4, (2008),
http://english.ckgsb.edu.cn/sites/default/files/privatization_in_china.
pdf.
66
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enterprises. 71 Such cooperatives maintained ownership of
the enterprise with the state, while distributing control and a
portion of the profits to private individuals. It was not until
after the proliferation of these cooperatives that subsequent
reforms allowed private individuals to enter the market for
themselves. 72 This gradual pace allowed China the
opportunity to experiment and determine which legislation
worked best to develop an effective private sector. As a
result, by the time large-scale privatization of state labor and
assets began in the 1990s, both the Chinese legal
environment and market infrastructure were adequately
prepared to deal with the needs of the market.73
That being said, deficiencies in the economic
production and profitability of state-owned enterprises may
present temptation to rush privatization. For example, after
large-scale privatization began in the 1990s, nearly half of
Chinese state-owned enterprises reported zero or negative
equity, and the others were significantly less productive
than similar privately-owned businesses. 74 This result is
consistent with the economic theory that private individuals
are more efficient owners of assets than the state.75 This is
due in part to the fact that state-owned enterprises suffer
from reduced incentives to improve their operating

Id. at 2-3.
Id.
73 Id. at 12-13.
74 Id.
75 Marko Simoneti, Efficiency of mass privatization vs. gradual privatization:
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efficiencies, social responsibilities, and pricing models.76 As
a result of these reduced incentives, there is temptation to
transfer state labor and assets to the private sector as quickly
as possible. However, such temptation must be controlled.
As stated above, an effective privatization is not only
dependent on the speed at which state labor and assets are
transitioned into the private sector, but it is also dependent
on the legal and market reforms that proceed and prepare
for privatization.77 As a result, while economic production
may benefit from private ownership, the privatization of
state labor and assets should be restricted until both the legal
and market infrastructure have been sufficiently adapted to
support the transition. Without these reforms, private
business will not have the legal and infrastructural
prerequisites necessary to function efficiently, effectively
making the economic advantages of private ownership
unobtainable.
VIII.

THE CUBAN PRIVATE SECTOR
A. INEFFICIENCIES OF CUBA’S LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

As of now, the legal environment in Cuba is too
restrictive to support a successful private sector. Cuban
legislation not only limits the number of permissible forms
of self-employment, but also directly restricts the growth of
private business by limiting both investment and the

Id.
Jie Gan, Privatization in China: Experiences and Lessons, Hong Kong
University of Science and Technology, 2-4, (2008),
http://english.ckgsb.edu.cn/sites/default/files/privatization_in_china.
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acquisition of real property. As discussed above, for a
private sector to be successful, a socialist nation must reform
its legal environment prior to expanding the private
workforce. However, the Cuban government has failed to do
this. Despite identifying over 300 articles of the legislative
code in need of reform to support privatization, as of 2013
the Cuban government has implemented only 46 of them. 78
Despite these minimal legislative reforms, Cuba has
proceeded to rapidly transition both state labor and assets
into the private sector. As of today, approximately 10% of
Cuban state labor has already been transitioned into the
private market, and another 21% is expected to follow. 79
Ultimately, both Cuba’s legal and market environment are
not prepared to support this large influx of labor.
Currently, Cuban workers are limited to 201 types of
entrepreneurial licenses, the majority of which are for menial
activities such as wrapping buttons, shining shoes, cleaning
spark plugs, peeling fruit, selling fruit, and repairing
umbrellas. 80 As privatization and state layoffs in Cuba
continue, more and more workers will be forced to enter the

Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Institutional Changes of Cuba’s Economic-Social
Reforms, Brookings 2 (Aug. 2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/08/
cubas-economic-social-reformmesalago/cubaseconomicsocialreformsmesalago.pdf.
79 Id. at 8.
80 Jose Azel, The Illusions of the Cuban Reforms: Castro Strikes Out, World
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private sector.81 However, as a result of Cuba’s restrictive
legal environment, these workers are left with no other
alternative than to support themselves through menial labor.
Cuba has one of the best education systems in Latin
America. Limiting workers to this short list of menial tasks
unfairly limits workers’ earning potential by failing to make
use of this investment in education. Cuba has planned to
grow the private sector to sustain as many as 1.8 million
Cuban workers (approximately at least 31% of the labor
force). 82 Is it truly efficient for such a large percentage of
workers to work as shoe shiners and fruit vendors?
These restrictive policies not only create a ceiling on
private sector production, but are also likely to lead to an
increase in unemployment. This is because Cuba’s lack of
entrepreneurial diversity confines an ever increasing
segment of the workforce into a narrow range of
employment options. If not addressed, this is likely to lead
to a surplus of labor in these lines of work. As stated above,
labor surpluses are responsible for market inefficiencies, and
will artificially lower the price of goods and services, leading

Geoff Thale, Cuba’s New Labor Code and Foreign Investment Law:
Implications for Workers, Washington Office on Latin America (Jul. 2014),
http://www.wola.org/commentary/cuba_s_new_labor_code_and_forei
gn_investment_law_implications_for_workers.
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to unemployment. As a result, a sufficient amount of
entrepreneurial diversity is necessary not only to allow these
workers the opportunity to find a job, but instead to find
employment that will allow Cuba to maximize its
production.
Unfortunately, this lack of entrepreneurial diversity is
indicative of Cuba’s desire to limit private sector production.
This reasoning is supported by the fact that there is Cuban
legislation limiting the ability of private business owners to
contract with employees and foreign investors. As of today,
private businesses in Cuba are taxed so as to make hiring of
any employees prohibitive. 83 In fact, as a result of such
restrictions, as many as 85% of workers in the Cuban private
sector are self-employed.84 Additionally, the government has
restricted private sector production by limiting access to
foreign investment, forcing Cuban entrepreneurs to rely on
an already struggling domestic financing industry. Despite
the expansion of allowable foreign investment to include
criteria such as job creation and increases in national
production, foreign investment in Cuba has failed to make a

Philip Peters, Cuba’s Entrepreneurs: Foundation of a New Private Sector,
American 11 (Jul. 2012),
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significant contribution to the island’s economy. 85 This
failure is due in part to restrictive government selection
criteria and numerous policies disfavoring foreign
ownership. 86 While restrictions such as these are likely
inspired by Cuba’s history of socialism, by reforming its
legal environment in this manner, the Cuban government
has effectively limited the private sector’s development.
IX.

INSUFFICIENCIES
INFRASTRUCTURE

OF

CUBA’S

MARKET

In addition to its legal restrictions, Cuba’s market
infrastructure also indirectly restricts worker access to the
market by obstructing access to business necessities such as
storefront (real property), capital, supplies, and inventory.
Finding funding and capital are often any entrepreneur’s
first obstacle to entering the private market, and
entrepreneurs in Cuba are no different. Despite the largely
menial nature of private employment currently permitted,
the need for storefront, capital, supplies, and inventory is
still a prerequisite for business. Accordingly, the current
scarcity of these business inputs acts as a major obstacle to
entering the Cuban market.

Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Can Cuba’s Reforms Succeed?, Americas Quarterly,
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A. CAPITAL
Currently, access to financing in Cuba is grossly
insufficient to support widespread private enterprise. From
2011 to 2013, as little as 218,400 loans were granted by the
Central Bank of Cuba, each averaging a mere $141. 87
Additionally, only 0.2% (4368 loans) of these loans went to
self-employed workers. 88 Capital is the life blood of the
market, and without sufficient access to credit, businesses
will fail to enter or remain in the market. As a result, many
Cuban workers have been forced to rely on personal savings
to supplement this lack of capital. Unfortunately, Cuban
workers suffer from chronically low wages, with the average
Cuban citizen earning roughly $20 per month. 89 Yet,
depending on the enterprise, starting a small business in
Cuba could require an initial investment of $220 to $6,000
(excluding property rental expenses).90 Accordingly, it could

Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Institutional Changes of Cuba’s Economic-Social
Reforms, Brookings 8 (Aug. 2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/08/
cubas-economic-social-reformmesalago/cubaseconomicsocialreformsmesalago.pdf.
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take some workers as much as 25 years worth of salary
($6000) to begin a private business, based on savings alone.
Some workers have been able to partially circumvent
this problem by receiving funding from abroad. This
funding is in the form of remittances from family members
in other countries—commonly from the United States. As a
result, workers fortunate enough to receive remittances have
access to a limited form of financing that is unavailable to
other citizens. Accordingly, they can utilize these subsidies
to fund their businesses. This access to foreign capital
provides these workers with a tremendous competitive
advantage, and is partly responsible for increases in income
inequality. However, regulations limiting the amount and
size of remittances prohibit these subsidies from becoming a
genuine solution to significant capital needs, leaving even
some of these foreign-subsidized entrepreneurs in need of
additional financing.
B. STOREFRONT
For those workers who are able to obtain access to
capital, the expense and unavailability of storefront may still
prevent them from entering the market. In Cuba, access to
storefront is restricted by overbearing regulations on the
transfer of real property. For years in Cuba it was not
possible to sell real property at all, transfers of real property
could only occur by essentially trading two properties of

http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=37d8e
2c5-96bc-4b33-8312-963189f8a4df.
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equal value (the Permuta system). 91 While reforms have
alleviated this restriction—allowing regulated sales of real
property for the first time—Cuban property law remains
restrictive.
For example, Cuban real property law limits the
amount of property a citizen may own, prohibits real estate
lawyers from operating on the island, prohibits foreigners
from purchasing real property, and requires notary approval
prior to any sale.92 Additionally, even when these hurdles
can be overcome and a transaction is feasible, the majority of
Cuba’s property is in disrepair. A 2013 survey studying the
condition of structures in Havana estimated that 58% of the
city’s structures were in poor or critical condition. 93 The
additional expense of repairs, as well as government taxes,
fees, and restrictions on construction, make useable
storefront harder to acquire. As a result, despite the
apparent efforts of the Cuban legislature to expand the
private sector, meaningful entrepreneurship is forced to try
to flourish from homes and street carts.

Lina Forero, Book Note, The Cuban Government Approves Guidelines to
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92 John Arlidge, Cuba, Home of the World’s Oddest Property Market,
Financial Times (2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/95d3017e-d36411e2-b3ff-00144feab7de.html#slide0.
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C. SUPPLIES AND INVENTORY
Finally, even if an aspiring private worker is able to
obtain access to capital and acquire a storefront, their access
to the private market is still restricted by the unavailability
of supplies and inventory. According to Cuban
entrepreneurs, “the most significant problem facing small
business on the island is the cost and availability of
supplies.”94 The lack of access to wholesale markets, dismal
domestic production, and high import duties make
acquiring necessary business inputs costly and difficult. In
fact, one study found that the most affordable way to
acquire necessary business prerequisites, is for workers to
purchase their supplies at state-run dollar stores.95 However,
the lack of product variety and quality at these stores often
causes Cuban workers to struggle to acquire the supplies
they need—forcing them to look outside the island for
necessities. As a result, despite the expansion of
entrepreneurial freedoms, the unavailability of necessary
business inputs restricts worker access to the market.

Ricardo Amack, Suppling Growth: Purchasing Challenges and
Opportunities for Cuban Entrepreneurs, The Cuban Study Group 2 (Jul.
2015),
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IMMEDIATE

Regardless of what the recent legislation means for the
future of Cuba’s economic ideology, the reality is that these
reforms have created various challenges for Cubans living
on the island today. These challenges have been caused by
Cuba’s inability to synchronize the growth of the private
labor force with the pace of legislation. Despite extensive
restrictions to market access, the number of workers entering
the private workforce has been increasing. As stated above,
since 2013, over half a million state workers have been laid
off (10% of the labor force) and over a million more are
scheduled to follow (21% of the labor force).96 This inability
to liberalize the legal and market environment prior to
transitioning state labor into the private sector has placed
large numbers of Cuban workers in a private sector lacking
sufficient legal development. Essentially, this has created a
blind spot of Cuban workers with needs left unaddressed by
the gradual pace of reform.
Due to the lack of a developed private sector in Cuba,
there are insufficient private businesses waiting to hire
discharged workers. As a result, these workers are left with
no other recourse to find work than to apply for one of the
201 entrepreneurial licenses—and start their own

Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Institutional Changes of Cuba’s Economic-Social
Reforms, Brookings 8 (Aug. 2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/08/
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businesses.97 This rapid growth in entrepreneurship ignores
the realities of Cuba’s poor infrastructure, lack of investment
capital, and lack of entrepreneurial diversity, all of which are
necessary for private enterprise. As a result, critics argue
that Cuban legislation has left workers in danger of
exploitation and increased income inequality.98
Income inequality in Cuba has been rising since the
implementation of the reforms in 2010.99 This rise in income
inequality has been connected to unequal access to business
prerequisites such as capital, supplies, and storefront.
Citizens fortunate enough to receive remittances and
supplies
from
family
abroad
have
potentially
insurmountable advantages over their competitors. 100 Not
only do these remittances and care packages serve as a form
of financing that is unavailable to other citizens, but each US
dollar they receive is worth nearly 25 times more than the
Cuban peso. 101 As a result, inequalities in access to financing
have led to inequality in access to business inputs, and
ultimately, to inequality in access to the private market.
Despite the fact that Cuba has attempted to initiate reforms

Jose Azel, The New Cuba Policy: Fallacies and Implications, World Affairs
Journal (2015), http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/new-cubapolicy-fallacies-and-implications.
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in micro credit, bank accounts, and wholesale markets to
alleviate these issues, these reforms have been grossly
insufficient. 102 As more workers are forced to trade state
employment for private entrepreneurship, the price and
competition for these already dwindling business resources
will continue to increase. Potentially, this can create a
circumstance where private sector success would be more
dependent on whether or not a business can receive support
from abroad, than on the merits of its own goods and
services.
In fact, there is already concern that the gradual pace
of reform has been insufficient to prevent labor injustice.103
The restrictions on market access and the increases in the
private workforce have dangerously increased competition
for employment. As desperation for work emerges, private
workers are placed at risk of exploitation. Cuba has long
been accused of numerous international labor rights
violations, even before the institution of these economic
reforms.104 Such violations are likely to worsen as increased
competition creates greater incentives for employers to

Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Institutional Changes of Cuba’s Economic-Social
Reforms, Brookings (Aug. 2014),
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exploit their workers. 105 While Cuba does have a national
labor union to help regulate these concerns, most
commentators feel it is insufficient. The Central de
Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC),106 Cuba’s national labor union,
primarily operates as a political instrument.107 The CTC does
not engage in collective bargaining over wages, hours, or
terms of employment. Instead, the CTC merely reports
worker grievances to the government.108 As a result, critics
argue that the CTC “will need to evolve in recognition of the
ways in which [private] workers’ interests diverge from the
interests of the state.” 109
Although the long-term goals of the Cuban reforms
are yet to come, there is a need to address the immediate
concerns of workers currently entering the private sector.
The inability to liberalize the legal and market environment
prior to transitioning state labor into the private sector has
exposed Cuban workers to increased inequality and
exploitation. The challenges of private enterprise, especially
on an island with poor infrastructure and supplies, create
substantial uncertainty about the success these new
entrepreneurs will have. As more workers are forced to
trade state employment for private entrepreneurship, they
put at risk the modest wages sustaining them. As a result,
there must be sufficient legal and market reforms to allow
these workers to be successful.
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A. POSITIVE IMPACT OF THE REFORMS TODAY
Despite these deficiencies, the recent reforms have
also had both direct and indirect benefits for the Cuban
economy. Most notably, the policies have reduced the
government’s inflated payroll. Prior to these reforms, the
Cuban government—like most other socialist states—was
responsible for nearly every economic activity. As a result,
prior to these reforms, the government had been forced to
subsidize inefficient SOEs in order to ensure that necessary
services remained available to the public. The gradual
emergence of a private sector has reduced the need for
government subsidies by continuing to provide public
services after unprofitable SOEs are terminated. 110 As a
result, these reforms have not only saved the Cuban
government money, but have also promoted efficiency by
replacing, as opposed to subsidizing, inefficient SOEs.
Under the central planning of Cuba’s previous model,
market forces, such as competition, were severely
restricted.111 By expanding the private sector, the new model
allows for the promotion of efficiency through increased
competition. This rationale is based on the “invisible hand”
economic theory, which states that competition will cause
bad businesses to close and successful ones to succeed.
Ending government subsidies, which until now had been

Philip Peters, A Viewers Guide to Cuba’s Economic Reforms, American
16 (May 2012),
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keeping several inefficient SOEs afloat, will force inefficient
firms to find ways to reduce costs and promote efficiency.
Accordingly, the Cuban government has forced SOEs to
either turn a profit or close their doors. 112 While such a
measure seems harsh, it is essential for Cuba to trim the fat.
By subsidizing poor business models, it is preventing
progress and efficiency. Over time, Cuba should expect to
benefit from the effects of increased competition in the
market.113
Finally, the privatization reforms have provided the
Cuban government with a new stream of taxable income—
the newly licensed businesses. 114 In 2011, the Cuban
government instituted a revised tax policy that would target
the cuentapropistas (the Cuban entrepreneurs) directly.115 The
policy taxes entrepreneurs at roughly 35%.116 This number is
composed of a 10% income tax and a 25% “contribution” to
the social security system.117 Accordingly, this expansion of
the private workforce has provided the Cuban government
with yet another tool to reduce its deficit.
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Ultimately, creating a successful institutional
environment in Cuba will take time. Up to now, Cuba’s
reforms have been insufficient to support the growth of a
private sector. The Cuban reforms have failed to address the
legal and practical concerns preventing market access. The
most notable of these is the lack of entrepreneurial diversity
and the unavailability of business prerequisites such as
storefront (real property), capital, supplies, and inventory.
Ultimately, although Cuba claims to intend to promote
private sector growth, its failure to synchronize the growth
of the private sector with the pace of legislation has in fact
stifled its development. By shedding its excess state labor
and relocating those workers to the private sector, before
relieving the practical barriers to market entry, Cuba has
exposed its workers to exploitation and income inequality.
Ultimately, while the reforms in Cuba are a step in the right
direction, for the Cuban private sector to experience longterm success, more reforms are needed. A successful private
sector requires a fertile environment in which to grow and
develop. Without a sufficiently liberalized legal and market
infrastructure, the private market will not be able to succeed.
As a result, Cuba should not only limit the continued growth
of the private workforce—until greater legislative reforms
have been enacted—but should also initiate legislation to
address the current needs of its private workers.

